Evil green beards: tag recognition can also be used to withhold cooperation in structured populations

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.07.002zbMath1343.92408OpenAlexW2154560664WikidataQ50453166 ScholiaQ50453166MaRDI QIDQ739687

Julián García, Arne Traulsen, Matthijs van Veelen

Publication date: 19 August 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionevolutionary dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

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