Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation

DOI10.1007/S10479-011-0920-5zbMath1233.91017arXiv1102.1341OpenAlexW2090924287MaRDI QIDQ763107

Michel Grabisch

Publication date: 9 March 2012

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1102.1341

zbMATH Keywords

corecooperative gameWeber setbounded corerestricted cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (7)

Characterizations of solutions for games with precedence constraints ⋮ Order cones: a tool for deriving \(k\)-dimensional faces of cones of subfamilies of monotone games ⋮ Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities ⋮ The bounded core for games with precedence constraints ⋮ The core of games on ordered structures and graphs ⋮ On the restricted cores and the bounded core of games on distributive lattices ⋮ Applying Young diagrams to 2-symmetric fuzzy measures with an application to general fuzzy measures

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