Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation

DOI10.1007/s10479-011-0920-5zbMath1233.91017arXiv1102.1341MaRDI QIDQ763107

Michel Grabisch

Publication date: 9 March 2012

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1102.1341

zbMATH Keywords

core; cooperative game; Weber set; bounded core; restricted cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

The core of games on ordered structures and graphs, Characterizations of solutions for games with precedence constraints, Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities, Order cones: a tool for deriving \(k\)-dimensional faces of cones of subfamilies of monotone games, The bounded core for games with precedence constraints, Applying Young diagrams to 2-symmetric fuzzy measures with an application to general fuzzy measures, On the restricted cores and the bounded core of games on distributive lattices

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The restricted core of games on distributive lattices: how to share benefits in a hierarchy
• Communication and cooperation in public network situations
• The egalitarian solution for multichoice games
• Entropy of capacities on lattices and set systems
• A value for bi-cooperative games
• Monge extensions of cooperation and communication structures
• Values on regular games under Kirchhoff's laws
• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• A short proof of the inclusion of the core in the Weber set
• The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints
• Extension of values to games with multiple alternatives
• Probabilistic values on convex geometries
• On extreme points of the core and reduced games
• The Myerson value for union stable structures
• Cooperative games on antimatroids
• A consistent value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives.
• On the core of a collection of coalitions.
• Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
• Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications
• An axiomatization of entropy of capacities on set systems
• A new approach to the core and Weber set of multichoice games
• Games on lattices, multichoice games and the Shapley value: a new approach
• Cores of convex games
• Submodular functions and optimization.
• A NOTE ON SUBMODULAR FUNCTIONS ON DISTRIBUTIVE LATTICES
• The core of games on ordered structures and graphs