An experimental study of storable votes
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Publication:863272
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.004zbMath1151.91413WikidataQ56873871 ScholiaQ56873871MaRDI QIDQ863272
Alessandra Casella, Thomas R. Palfrey
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w9982.pdf
91B12: Voting theory
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