Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge?
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Publication:900144
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5zbMath1328.91013MaRDI QIDQ900144
Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler
Publication date: 1 January 2016
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5
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