The Shapley-Shubik index for simple games with multiple alternatives

DOI10.1007/S10479-007-0246-5zbMath1138.91322OpenAlexW2002262833MaRDI QIDQ926359

Antonio Magaña, Francesc Carreras

Publication date: 27 May 2008

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-007-0246-5

zbMATH Keywords

powervotingsimple gamegame with alternativesShapley-shubik index

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (3)

A Bayesian Monte Carlo method for computing the Shapley value: application to weighted voting and bin packing games ⋮ Games with Multiple Alternatives Applied to Voting Systems ⋮ Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets

Cites Work

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• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited
• The Banzhaf Index for Multicandidate Presidential Elections
• Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
• The banzhaf – coleman index for games withralternatives

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