School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:952781
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.008zbMath1153.91377MaRDI QIDQ952781
Publication date: 14 November 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.labsi.org/wp/labsi18.pdf
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