Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.04.019zbMath1161.91428OpenAlexW3124275701MaRDI QIDQ1021616

Matteo Triossi

Publication date: 8 June 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10533/130650

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

Related Items (5)

Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching ⋮ The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm

Cites Work

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• Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
• Implementation of college admission rules
• Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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