Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90036-5zbMath0574.90003OpenAlexW2073587922MaRDI QIDQ1063515

Ehud Lerer, Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90036-5

zbMATH Keywords

metric rationalizationmetrizable social decision rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (9)

Social compromise and social metrics ⋮ Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties ⋮ Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules ⋮ Distance rationalization of voting rules ⋮ Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice ⋮ Does avoiding bad voting rules result in good ones? ⋮ Metric rationalization of social welfare functions ⋮ Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion' ⋮ Is majority consistency possible?

Cites Work

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• Some measures of closeness to unanimity and their implications
• The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment

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