Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
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Publication:1189697
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90014-JzbMath0765.90091OpenAlexW2007742778MaRDI QIDQ1189697
John D. Geanakoplos, Eddie Dekel, Adam Brandenburger
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90014-j
Related Items (17)
Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models ⋮ The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces ⋮ Cognitive limits and preferences for information ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities ⋮ Agreeing to disagree in infinite information structures ⋮ Speculation under unawareness ⋮ On the nonexistence of universal information structures ⋮ Unawareness without AU introspection ⋮ Learning (to disagree?) in large worlds ⋮ Rational expectations can preclude trades ⋮ Epistemic foundations for set-algebraic representations of knowledge ⋮ The reeded edge and the Phillips curve: Money neutrality, common knowledge, and subjective beliefs ⋮ Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus ⋮ Ambiguous language and common priors ⋮ Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information ⋮ Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty
Cites Work
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- On existence and non-existence of proper, regular, conditional distributions
- Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus
- Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
- Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations
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