A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(76)90014-4zbMath0336.90076OpenAlexW2008476440MaRDI QIDQ1229815

Henrik Sahlquist, Bengt Hansson

Publication date: 1976

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(76)90014-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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