Independence of irrelevant alternatives, and solutions to Nash's bargaining problem

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Publication:1254952

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90008-4zbMath0399.90103OpenAlexW2047877462MaRDI QIDQ1254952

Alvin E. Roth

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90008-4




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