Efficient budget balancing cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
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Publication:1338090
DOI10.1007/BF01229315zbMath0811.90132MaRDI QIDQ1338090
Arthur Fishman, Dominique Demougin
Publication date: 27 November 1994
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01229315
imperfect monitoring; balanced budget side payments; heterogeneous products; infinitely repeated Cournot game
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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