Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2293zbMath0883.90024OpenAlexW2079801567MaRDI QIDQ1371188

Cheng Wang

Publication date: 28 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2293

zbMATH Keywords

agency theoryCEO compensationchief executive officerpay performance sensitivity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Related Items (4)

Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model ⋮ Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs ⋮ Stock grants as a commitment device ⋮ When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts

Cites Work

• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
• On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
• Incentives and Aggregate Shocks
• Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets

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