Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
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Publication:1368878
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2290zbMath0892.90192MaRDI QIDQ1368878
Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli
Publication date: 1 October 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2290
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