Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2290zbMath0892.90192MaRDI QIDQ1368878

Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli

Publication date: 1 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2290

zbMATH Keywords

communication equilibria; self-fulfilling mechanisms; \(T\)-stage repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B52: Special types of economic equilibria

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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