Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games

DOI10.1007/S001820050045zbMath0888.90168OpenAlexW2030550155MaRDI QIDQ1376985

Amit I. Pazgal

Publication date: 1 February 1998

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1126.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mutual interests gamessatisficing decision makers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective ⋮ Experimental evidence on case-based decision theory ⋮ WHEN ASPIRING AND RATIONAL AGENTS STRIVE TO COORDINATE ⋮ Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame. ⋮ Numerical analysis of a reinforcement learning model with the dynamic aspiration level in the iterated prisoner's dilemma

Cites Work

• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Cooperation and bounded recall
• Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Path dependence and learning from neighbors
• ASPIRATION-BASED REINFORCEMENT LEARNING IN REPEATED INTERACTION GAMES: AN OVERVIEW
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
• Cooperation and Effective Computability
• Case-Based Decision Theory
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

This page was built for publication: Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games