Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring
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Publication:1385272
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2332zbMath0896.90185OpenAlexW2088477390MaRDI QIDQ1385272
Publication date: 26 April 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/56a88e9ebf21a288379002b85af8243eb934d927
Related Items
On surplus-sharing in partnerships ⋮ Joint production in teams ⋮ Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents ⋮ Evidence disclosure and verifiability ⋮ Efficiency in sequential partnerships
Cites Work
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- Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
- Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
- An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
- Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
- Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents