The ecology of terror defense

DOI10.1023/A:1024167124083zbMath1047.91574MaRDI QIDQ1404268

Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard J. Zeckhauser

Publication date: 21 August 2003

Published in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

terrorism; economies of scale; avoidance; stock control; security externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91F10: History, political science

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