Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.
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Publication:1410900
DOI10.1016/S0895-7177(03)80003-1zbMath1044.91013OpenAlexW1968384148MaRDI QIDQ1410900
Hans-Hermann Bock, William H. E. Day, Fred R. McMorris
Publication date: 15 October 2003
Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0895-7177(03)80003-1
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- On the consistency of the plurality rule consensus function for molecular sequences
- Attainable results in committee elections.
- The asymptotic plurality rule for molecular sequences
- An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections
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