Computation of characteristic function values for linear-state differential games

DOI10.1023/A:1023612725533zbMath1049.91015OpenAlexW38399508MaRDI QIDQ1411498

Georges Zaccour

Publication date: 29 October 2003

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1023612725533

zbMATH Keywords

environmental economics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (7)

A friendly computable characteristic function ⋮ A dynamic game of waste management ⋮ Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries ⋮ Adaptation and the allocation of pollution reduction costs ⋮ Linear-State Differential Games in Partition Function Form ⋮ Balanced environmental games ⋮ Equilibrium coalition structures of differential games in partition function form

Cites Work

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• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
• A differential game of international pollution control
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• International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
• Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control
• Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second-best world: evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players
• Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
• Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution

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