The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00045-9zbMath1069.91039WikidataQ56443583 ScholiaQ56443583MaRDI QIDQ1420521

Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara, Makoto Yokoo

Publication date: 2 February 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00045-9

zbMATH Keywords

Mechanism design; Strategy-proof

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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