Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
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Publication:1566906
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2586zbMath0955.91048MaRDI QIDQ1566906
Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó, Ruth Martínez, Jorge A. Oviedo
Publication date: 4 March 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2586
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