Can negotiations prevent fish wars?

DOI10.1016/S0925-2312(99)00108-3zbMath0951.90050OpenAlexW2040635652MaRDI QIDQ1575287

K. Sneek, Harold Houba, Felix Várdy

Publication date: 21 August 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0925-2312(99)00108-3

zbMATH Keywords

Markov perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic models in economics (91B70) Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40)

Related Items (7)

Different time preferences and non-stationary contracts in negotiations ⋮ Fully absorbing dynamic compromise ⋮ Consistent conjectures in a dynamic model of non-renewable resource management ⋮ Recursive Nash bargaining over a productive asset ⋮ Incomplete information, learning, and natural resource management ⋮ Strategic growth with recursive preferences: decreasing marginal impatience ⋮ From jungle to civilized economy: the power foundation of exchange economy equilibrium

Cites Work

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• Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
• The tragedy of the commons?
• The policy bargaining model
• A class of trilinear differential games
• Economic Development and Agreeable Redistribution in Capitalism: Efficient Game Equilibria in a Two-Class Neoclassical Growth Model
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model

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