The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games
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Publication:1704051
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1036-xzbMath1392.91016OpenAlexW2589661434WikidataQ59614863 ScholiaQ59614863MaRDI QIDQ1704051
Publication date: 8 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1036-x
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