Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.02.006zbMath1118.91010OpenAlexW2102117952MaRDI QIDQ1779833

Arno Riedl, Akira Okada

Publication date: 1 June 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/1158/1/es-64.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

reciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

Evolution of fairness and coalition formation in three-person ultimatum games ⋮ A cooperative game with envy ⋮ How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication ⋮ Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence

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