Strong completeness theorems for weak logics of common belief

DOI10.1023/A:1023032105687zbMath1027.03013MaRDI QIDQ1810818

Luc Lismont, Philippe Mongin

Publication date: 9 June 2003

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1023032105687

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledge; strong completeness; common belief; logical omniscience

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)

Related Items

Philippe Mongin 1950--2020, The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation, The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory, Philippe Mongin (1950-2020), Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs

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