Rationalizability for social environments

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.11.003zbMath1099.91020MaRDI QIDQ1886749

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Publication date: 19 November 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/748385/guid-c1b9484d-b30c-4584-a202-c2fd765bf3c3-ASSET1.0.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Coalition formation; Coalitional rationality; Extensive-form rationalizability; Farsightedness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Dynamic coalitional equilibrium, Bayesian coalitional rationalizability, Farsightedly stable networks, Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability, A characterization of farsightedly stable networks, Coalition formation among farsighted agents, On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players

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