Bayesian learning in repeated games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1995.1002zbMath0835.90143OpenAlexW2127359945MaRDI QIDQ1893771

James S. Jordan

Publication date: 19 July 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1002

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian Nash equilibriadiscounted payoffsperfect recallfinite number of playersfinite number of actions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Belief-based equilibrium ⋮ Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games ⋮ Repeated large games with incomplete information ⋮ Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs ⋮ Reputation versus social learning ⋮ Dominance, sharing, and assessment in an iterated hawk-dove game ⋮ Limits to rational learning ⋮ Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games. ⋮ Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium. ⋮ Learning to play Bayesian games. ⋮ Learning in Games ⋮ Learning a population distribution ⋮ Mutual observability and the convergence of actions in a multi-person two-armed bandit model ⋮ Learning strategic environments: An experimental study of strategy formation and transfer ⋮ Learning to Coordinate in Social Networks ⋮ Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games ⋮ The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games

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