The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent
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Publication:2051507
DOI10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0zbMath1475.91034OpenAlexW3153667953MaRDI QIDQ2051507
Christoph Kuzmics, Christoph Diehl
Publication date: 24 November 2021
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0
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Cites Work
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