Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core
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Publication:2068882
DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01312-3zbMath1481.91126MaRDI QIDQ2068882
Flip Klijn, Markus Walzl, Christopher Kah
Publication date: 20 January 2022
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01312-3
91B68: Matching models
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