A note on the complexity of manipulating weighted Schulze voting
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2203580
DOI10.1016/j.ipl.2020.105989zbMath1466.91110arXiv1808.09226MaRDI QIDQ2203580
Publication date: 7 October 2020
Published in: Information Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.09226
68Q17: Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.)
91B14: Social choice
91B86: Mathematical economics and fuzziness
Cites Work
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- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Barriers to Manipulation in Voting