Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
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Publication:2235092
DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01296-6zbMath1471.91016arXiv2001.10197OpenAlexW3104860100MaRDI QIDQ2235092
Sascha Kurz, Issofa Moyouwou, Hilaire Touyem
Publication date: 20 October 2021
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.10197
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Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output ⋮ A critical analysis on the notion of power
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