Cooperative oligopoly games with boundedly rational firms

DOI10.1007/s10479-014-1580-zzbMath1307.91049arXiv1202.3885OpenAlexW2950537837MaRDI QIDQ2259035

Giorgos Stamatopoulos, Paraskevas V. Lekeas

Publication date: 27 February 2015

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1202.3885

zbMATH Keywords

corecooperative gamebounded rationalityexternalitiesCournot market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (7)

Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core ⋮ Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products ⋮ Optimal deterrence of cooperation ⋮ Endogenous interval games in oligopolies and the cores ⋮ On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies ⋮ Coalition formation in collaborative production and transportation with competing firms ⋮ The core in Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with transferable technologies

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