Stable sharing rules and participation in pools of essential patents

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.06.002zbMath1425.91245OpenAlexW2949200086WikidataQ127636413 ScholiaQ127636413MaRDI QIDQ2273934

Antonio Tesoriere

Publication date: 19 September 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.06.002

zbMATH Keywords

arbitragepatent poolssharing rulespool formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
• Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs
• Optimal formation rules for patent pools
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets
• ESTIMATING THE GAINS FROM TRADE IN THE MARKET FOR PATENT RIGHTS

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