Condorcet winning sets

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0853-4zbMath1318.91066OpenAlexW2042523999MaRDI QIDQ2341123

Edith Elkind, Abdallah Saffidine, Jérôme Lang

Publication date: 23 April 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0853-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

On stable rules for selecting committees ⋮ Properties of multiwinner voting rules ⋮ A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection ⋮ It is difficult to tell if there is a Condorcet spanning tree ⋮ Justified representation in approval-based committee voting ⋮ Coincidence of Condorcet committees ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees

Cites Work

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• Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
• Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
• Properties of multiwinner voting rules
• On the Computation of Fully Proportional Representation
• The Complexity of Fully Proportional Representation for Single-Crossing Electorates
• An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees

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