Justifiable punishments in repeated games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.07.004zbMath1311.91026OpenAlexW2020877590MaRDI QIDQ2345203

Quan Wen, Miguel Aramendia

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.004

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamefolk theoremrenegotiation proof

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Repeated Cournot model with justifiable punishments ⋮ Myopic perception in repeated games ⋮ Defensive Plays in Repeated Games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games

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