Biased contests for symmetric players

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.02.003zbMath1393.91078OpenAlexW2284350064MaRDI QIDQ2357814

Dmitry Ryvkin, Mikhail Drugov

Publication date: 20 June 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75378/1/MPRA_paper_75378.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

predictive powerwinner's effortaggregate effortbiased contestbiased contest success function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (15)

Simple equilibria in general contests ⋮ Head starts in dynamic tournaments? ⋮ Optimal tie-breaking rules ⋮ Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information ⋮ Complete-rent-dissipation contest design ⋮ Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information ⋮ Tournament rewards and heavy tails ⋮ Contests between groups of unknown size ⋮ Strategic rivalry for market share: a contest theory approach to dynamic advertising competition ⋮ Winner's effort maximization in large contests ⋮ Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information ⋮ Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players ⋮ On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests ⋮ Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts ⋮ Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players

Cites Work

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• Discontinuous games with asymmetric information: an extension of Reny's existence theorem
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• The incentive effect of a handicap
• Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents
• A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests
• DISCRIMINATION IN A MODEL OF CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT ABILITY

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