A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness

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Publication:2371149


DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.001zbMath1271.91044MaRDI QIDQ2371149

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 29 June 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2006-05.pdf


91A80: Applications of game theory

91B16: Utility theory

91B08: Individual preferences


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