On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game
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Publication:2376070
DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0372-zzbMath1269.91008OpenAlexW2053849255MaRDI QIDQ2376070
Publication date: 26 June 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0372-z
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