A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0320-3zbMath1269.91051OpenAlexW2015298863MaRDI QIDQ2376076

Eric Bahel, Christian Trudeau

Publication date: 26 June 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0320-3

zbMATH Keywords

cost-sharing modeldummy axiomflow methodstechnological cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items

Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation ⋮ Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case ⋮ Shapley-Shubik methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation ⋮ Minimum cost spanning tree problems with indifferent agents ⋮ Stable cost sharing in production allocation games ⋮ A cost sharing example in which subsidies are necessary for stability ⋮ Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games ⋮ Stable lexicographic rules for shortest path games

Cites Work

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• Partially Symmetric Values
• The selection of joint projects by a consortium: Cost sharing mechanisms
• On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theoretic approach
• On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method

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