Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games
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Publication:2384721
DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0078-1zbMath1124.91009OpenAlexW2038658015MaRDI QIDQ2384721
Publication date: 10 October 2007
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/23396
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Social norms and random matching games
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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