Alternating-offers bargaining with one-sided uncertain deadlines: an efficient algorithm

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2007.11.007zbMath1183.68631OpenAlexW2161506569MaRDI QIDQ2389651

Nicola Gatti, Stefano Marino, Francesco Di Giunta

Publication date: 17 July 2009

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2007.11.007

zbMATH Keywords

game theorymultiagent systemsautomated negotiations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Related Items (4)

Human-computer negotiation in a three player market setting ⋮ Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders ⋮ Alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settings ⋮ Extending the alternating-offers protocol in the presence of competition: Models and theoretical analysis

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• Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information

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