Collusion in atomic splittable routing games

DOI10.1007/s00224-012-9421-4zbMath1270.91016MaRDI QIDQ2392243

Chien-Chung Huang

Publication date: 1 August 2013

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-012-9421-4

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibria; collusion; exact algorithms; selfish routing; social cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A30: Utility theory for games

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Unnamed Item, Generalizations of weighted matroid congestion games: pure Nash equilibrium, sensitivity analysis, and discrete convex function, Strategic decentralization in binary choice composite congestion games, Equilibrium computation in resource allocation games

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