Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.03.004zbMath1394.91171OpenAlexW971514976MaRDI QIDQ2399670

Lucie Ménager

Publication date: 24 August 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkcollusionprocurement auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
• Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Coordination in auctions with entry
• Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• A Multistage Model of Bargaining
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information

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