Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
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Publication:2411514
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.001zbMath1415.91179MaRDI QIDQ2411514
Publication date: 24 October 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.001
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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Cites Work
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
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- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.