Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection

DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1147-zzbMath1410.91193OpenAlexW3015718061MaRDI QIDQ2417398

Nicolas Motz

Publication date: 12 June 2019

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42678/1/MPRA_paper_42678.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

political partieselectoral competitioncandidate selectionelectoral incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• An empirical analysis of valence in electoral competition
• A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Political Motivations
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare
• Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House
• Parties as Political Intermediaries
• Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India

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