Aggregation of Bayesian preferences: unanimity vs monotonicity

DOI10.1007/S00355-018-1158-9zbMath1410.91198OpenAlexW2724753690WikidataQ129061240 ScholiaQ129061240MaRDI QIDQ2417410

Federica Ceron, Vassili Vergopoulos

Publication date: 12 June 2019

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01539444/file/17028.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto dominanceaggregation of Bayesian preferencesstatewise dominancesubjective expected utility functional

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence ⋮ Rawls's difference principle and maximin rule of allocation: a new analysis ⋮ Bayesian social aggregation with non-Archimedean utilities and probabilities

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