Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.05.002zbMath1288.91107OpenAlexW3121713569MaRDI QIDQ2434348

Xavier Vives, Alexander Kovalenkov

Publication date: 5 February 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2446.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

rate of convergenceinformation acquisitionstrategic equilibriumGrossman-Stiglitz paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Stochastic models in economics (91B70) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Informed speculation with k-level reasoning ⋮ Public information and uninformed trading: implications for market liquidity and price efficiency ⋮ Large strategic dynamic interactions ⋮ Information, market power and welfare ⋮ The negative value of private information in illiquid markets ⋮ Introduction to financial economics ⋮ Prospect theory and market quality ⋮ Stock-based pay, liquidity, and the role of market making ⋮ Net trade and market efficiency in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) ⋮ The social value of information with an endogenous public signal ⋮ Price discovery using a double auction ⋮ Information aggregation in a financial market with general signal structure

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• On the aggregation of information in competitive markets
• Diversification and competition: Financial intermediation in a large Cournot-Walras economy
• Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions
• Strategic Supply Function Competition With Private Information
• Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
• A Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium for Multi-Asset Securities Markets
• Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
• Efficiency of Large Double Auctions

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