Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.11.006zbMath1284.91188OpenAlexW3122251958WikidataQ113870937 ScholiaQ113870937MaRDI QIDQ2441218

Lars Peter Metzger

Publication date: 24 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.11.006

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilitywar of attritioncontinuous stabilityevolutionary robustnessneighborhood invader strategystrict equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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