What shall we do with the cyclic profile?
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Publication:2452147
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0596-4zbMath1287.91053OpenAlexW1964572799MaRDI QIDQ2452147
Publication date: 30 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0596-4
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