An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements

DOI10.1016/j.jeem.2007.02.004zbMath1130.91391OpenAlexW3122641130MaRDI QIDQ2465991

Alistair Ulph, Santiago J. Rubio

Publication date: 11 January 2008

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/33203/1/0210.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

self-enforcing international environmental agreementsstock pollutantinternal and external stability conditions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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